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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
REAL PROPERTY
In Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v. Linzell' the plaintiff sought dam-
ages against the Director of Highways by virtue of a written contract
with a named landowner for billboard rights, which rights were abro-
gated by appropriation of the land for a public purpose. Defendant's
demurrer was sustained by the court of common pleas which entered final
judgment for the defendant. This judgment was affirmed by the court
of appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The essential missing allegation in plaintiff's petition was a failure to
allege that any estate in land was conveyed to petitioner by said contract.
In fact it was not contended by plaintiff that its agreement with the land-
owner gave plaintiff any estate or interest in the real estate. The holding
by the court was that the assertion by the state of its ownership rights
in real estate so as to prevent the exercise of contractual rights does not
constitute a taking by the state of such contractual rights. Needless to
add, the plaintiff was not entitled to share in the appropriation proceeds.
The theory of the court was that in exercising its power to appropri-
ate, the government may have rendered the performance of the contract
impossible, but this merely ends or terminates the contract, and does not
constitute an appropriation of the contract.
The obvious caveat to the parties to such a contract is that they pro-
vide for an estate in land, such as a term for years renewable, if it be the
intention of the parties that the proceeds of any appropriation are to be
shared.
In The Masonic Temple Co. v. Adams,2 the court of appeals construed
an option agreement '"Within ten days after the purchaser elects to exer-
cise this option and make the final payment (said sum to be paid by
April 1, 1957), we agree to furnish said purchaser a guaranteed title...."
Time was of the essence by express provision in the option. The pur-
chaser put the purchase money in escrow prior to April 1, 1957 with in-
structions to pay on presentment of a warranty deed and a guaranteed
title report.
In an appeal of law and fact, the court of appeals rendered a decree
for appellants on the theory that the requirements of the option must be
literally complied with, and the deposit of the purchase money in escrow
to be paid on condition is not the equivalent of payment by April 1, 1957.
In Civilian Defense, Inc. v. Ross,3 the plaintiff sought to enjoin de-
fendants from interfering with plaintiff's egress and ingress over defend-
1. 168 Ohio St. 259, 153 N.F.2d 773 (1958).
2. 153 N.E2d 198 (Ohio Ct App. 1958).
3. 152 N.B2d 160 (Ohio Ct App. 1958).
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